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In the Absence of Information, the Only
Reasonable Negotiation Scheme Is Offering a
Certain Percentage of the Original Request:
A Proof
Miroslav Svítek, Olga Kosheleva, and Vladik Kreinovich

Abstract In the case of complete information, a reasonable solution to a negotiation
process is Nash’s bargaining solution, in which we maximize the product of all
agents’ utility gains. This is the only solution that does not depend on the order in
which we list the agents, and does not change if we use a different scale for describing
each agent’s utility. In this paper, we apply similar invariance criteria to a situation
when practically all information is absent, and all we know is the smallest and largest
possible gains. We show that in this situation, the only invariant negotiation strategy
is to offer, to each agent, a certain percentage of the original request – and to select
the percentage for which all such reduced requests can be satisfied.

1 Formulation of the Problem
How people make decisions: a brief reminder. According to decision theory (see,
e.g., [1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10]), decisions of a rational person can be described by assigning,
to each alternative, a numerical value known as utility, so that in each situation, the
alternative selected by the decision maker is the one with the largest utility value.
Utility can be described, e.g., by selecting:
• a very bad alternative 𝐴0 – worse than any actual alternatives, and
• a very good alternative 𝐴1 – better than any actual alternative.
To find the utility of an alternative 𝐴, we can compare it with lotteries 𝐿 ( 𝑝) in which:
• the user gets 𝐴1 with probability 𝑝 and
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• the user gets 𝐴0 with the remaining probability 1 − 𝑝.
Due to our choice of 𝐴𝑖 :
• for 𝑝 = 1, we have 𝐿(1) = 𝐴1 , which is better than 𝐴 (we will denote it by
𝐿 (1) > 𝐴), and
• for 𝑝 = 0, we have 𝐴 > 𝐿(0) = 𝐴0 .
One can prove that there exists a threshold value 𝑢( 𝐴)
• for which 𝐿( 𝑝) > 𝐴 for 𝑝 > 𝑢( 𝐴) and
• for which 𝐿( 𝑝) < 𝐴 for 𝑝 < 𝑢( 𝐴).
This threshold value is known as the utility of the alternative 𝐴.
The numerical value 𝑢( 𝐴) depends on our choice of the two extreme alternatives
𝐴𝑖 . It turns out that if we select a different pairs of extreme alternatives, then the new
values of the utility 𝑢 ′ ( 𝐴) can be obtained from the previous values 𝑢( 𝐴) by a linear
transformation 𝑢 ′ ( 𝐴) = 𝑎 + 𝑏 · 𝑢( 𝐴), for some constants 𝑎 and 𝑏 > 0.
Comment. When the outcomes are purely financial, in the first approximation, we
can view the money amounts as utility values. However, it is important to take into
account that many negotiations involve non-financial issues as well, and that even
for financial issues, utility is not always proportional to money.
Cooperative group decision making: case of full information. Cooperative decision making is when we have a status quo situation 𝑆, and several (𝑛) agents are
looking for alternatives that can make the outcomes better for all of them.
In many real-life situations, everyone known everyone’s utility 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴) for each
alternative 𝐴. Since utility values are defined only modulo a linear transformation,
it makes sense to consider decision strategies for which:
• the resulting solution would not change if we apply linear re-scaling 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴) →
𝑎 𝑖 + 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴) to one of the utilities, and
• the resulting solution would not change if we simply rename the agents.
It turns out that the only such not-changing (= invariant) scheme is when the agents
maximize the product of their utility gains, i.e., the value
(𝑢 1 ( 𝐴) − 𝑢 1 (𝑆)) · . . . · (𝑢 𝑛 ( 𝐴) − 𝑢 𝑛 (𝑆));
see, e.g., [5, 6, 7]. This scheme was first proposed by the Nobelist John Nash and is
thus known as Nash’s bargaining solution.
Sometimes, we do not have the full knowledge. In some situations – e.g., when
two countries have a territorial dispute – we do have full information of what each
side wants. However, in other situations – e.g., in negotiations between companies –
agents are reluctant to disclose their utilities: while in this case, they are collaborating,
in the future, they may be competing, and any information about each other leads to
a competitive advantage.
In many cases, the only two things we know for each agent 𝑖 are:
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• the agent’s utility 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆) corresponding to status quo – which is usually known
because of the reporting requirements, and
• the agent’s original offer 𝑢 𝑖(0) – which usually means the best outcome that the
agent can reach:
def

𝑢 𝑖(0) = 𝑢 𝑖 = max 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴).
𝐴
def

In other words, for each agent, we know the largest value 𝑔𝑖(0) = 𝑢 𝑖(0) − 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆) that
this agent can gain. Based on this information, how can we make a joint decision?
General idea. In practice, it is never possible to each agent to get the largest possible
gain, there is usually a need for a trade-off between agents. Since agents cannot all
get their maximum gain, a natural idea is to somewhat

lower their requests, from the
(0)
(1)
(0)
original values 𝑔𝑖 to smaller values 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 𝑔𝑖
for some function 𝑓𝑖 (𝑔) for
which 𝑓𝑖 (𝑔) < 𝑔. Then:
• if it is possible to satisfy all reduced requests, then this is the desired joint solution;
• if it is not possible to satisfy all reduced
then the request amounts should

 requests,
(1)
(2)
be reduced again, to values 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑓𝑖 𝑔𝑖 , etc.
The procedure should be fair, meaning that the same reducing function 𝑓 (𝑔) should
be applied for all the agents: 𝑓𝑖 (𝑔) = 𝑓 (𝑔) for all 𝑖.
Question. The main question is: what reducing function 𝑓 (𝑔) should we use?

2 Which Reducing Function Should We Use
Natural requirement: reminder. As we have mentioned in our description of Nash’s
bargaining solution, since utilities are only known modulo linear transformations, a
natural requirement is that the resulting decision not change if we use re-scale an
agent’s utilities, from the original values 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴) to new values 𝑎 𝑖 + 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴). Let us
apply the same invariance criterion to our problem.
Which reducing functions are invariant under re-scaling? Under the linear
transformation 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴) ↦→ 𝑎 𝑖 + 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴), we get 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆) ↦→ 𝑎 𝑖 + 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆) and
𝑢 𝑖(0) ↦→ 𝑎 𝑖 + 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑢 𝑖(0) . Thus, the difference 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑢 𝑖(0) − 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆) get transformed into the
difference




𝑔𝑖 ↦→ 𝑎 𝑖 + 𝑏 𝑖 · ·𝑢 𝑖(0) − (𝑎 𝑖 + 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑢 𝑖 ( 𝐴)) = 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑢 𝑖(0) − 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆) = 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑔𝑖 .
So, using a new scale means multiplying all gain values 𝑔𝑖 by 𝑏 𝑖 . (Vice versa, to
transform the new-scale gain value into the original scale, we need to divide this
new-scale value by 𝑏 𝑖 .)
Let us see when the reducing function is invariant under such re-scaling.
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• In the original
utility
scale, we transform the gain 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) into the reduced


 gain

(𝑘+1)
(𝑘)
𝑔𝑖
= 𝑓 𝑔𝑖 . In the new scale, the reduced gain takes the form 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑓 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) .
• Let us see what happens if we apply the reducing function to the values described
in the new scale. The original gain 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) in the new scale has the form 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) .
When we apply the reducing function to this value, we get the new-scale value


𝑓 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) .
Invariance means that both new-scale gains should be equal, i.e., that we should have




𝑓 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) = 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑓 𝑏 𝑖 · 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) .
This equality should hold for all possible values of 𝑏 𝑖 and 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) . In particular, for any
number 𝑔 > 0, for 𝑏 𝑖 = 𝑔 and 𝑔𝑖(𝑘) = 1, we get 𝑓 (𝑔) = 𝑐 · 𝑓 (𝑔) for some constant
def

𝑐 = 𝑓 (1).
Since we must have 𝑓 (𝑔) < 𝑔, we should have 𝑐 < 1. Thus, we arrive at the
following conclusion.
Resulting recommendation. In the above absence-of-information case, the only
fair scale-invariant scheme is for all agents to select a certain percentage 𝑐 of their
original request – e.g., 70% or 60% – and to decrease this percentage 𝑐 until we find
a solution for which each agent can get this percentage of his/her original request.
Comments. Once this value 𝑐 is found, the gain 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑢 𝑖 − 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆) will be equal to
𝑔𝑖 = 𝑐 · (𝑢 𝑖 − 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆)) and thus, the utility of the 𝑖-th agent will be equal to
𝑢 𝑖 = 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆) + 𝑐 · (𝑢 𝑖 − 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆)) = 𝑐 · 𝑢 𝑖 + (1 − 𝑐) · 𝑢 𝑖 .
In this problem, the smallest utility 𝑢 𝑖 the agent can end up with is the status-quo
value 𝑢 𝑖 (𝑆). In these terms, the resulting gain has the form
𝑢 𝑖 = 𝑐 · 𝑢 𝑖 + (1 − 𝑐) · 𝑢 𝑖 .
Interestingly, this expression coincides with another expression for decision theory: Hurwicz formula that describe the equivalent utility of a situation in which all
we know is that the actual utility will be in the interval [𝑢 𝑖 , 𝑢 𝑖 ]; see, e.g., [3, 4, 5].
The formulas are similar, but there is an important difference between these two
situations:
• in the Hurwicz situation, the coefficient 𝑐 depends on each user, it describe how
optimistic the user is;
• in contrast, in our situation, the coefficient 𝑐 is determined by the group as a
whole, it describe how much the group can achieve.
The above solution is also similar to the usual solution to the bankruptcy problem,
when everyone gets a certain percentage 𝑐 · 𝑚 𝑖 of the amount it is owed – e.g., 20
cents the dollar, and the coefficient 𝑐 is the largest for which such solution is possible.
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